
If the Army executes this across PAC-3 MSE and PRSM sustainment, it forces the primes to either accept lower subcontract pass-throughs or lose volume. Lockheed's Missile Fire Control division and RTX's Missiles & Fire Control will feel this first — both are margin-constrained on extended production runs. Northrop's munitions business is smaller but similarly exposed on AGM-88 HARM sustainment.
The second-order effect: primes will push back by integrating subcontractor functions in-house (hiring away talent, acquiring small suppliers, or consolidating suppliers). This accelerates the vertical integration trend already underway at RTX and Lockheed, which could actually reduce competition if the Army doesn't simultaneously open subcontractor selection to new entrants.
Lockheed Martin, RTX, and Northrop Grumman have historically controlled the subcontractor relationship — setting margins, controlling specifications, and capturing the full contract value.
Direct Army negotiation with subcontractors (Raytheon, Orbital ATK, Moog, General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems) threatens to compress prime margins on PAC-3, PRSM, and other missile programs by forcing cost transparency.
If subcontractors can negotiate directly with Army Contracting Command, they can undercut the primes' cost-plus-fee structure, which means the primes lose leverage on sustainment and upgrade contracts where they've historically recouped development costs. The timeline is immediate — Army Contracting Command is "soon" implementing this, which means contract negotiations for FY27 LRIP lots could be affected.
Does Army Contracting Command have statutory authority to bypass primes on existing IDIQ or LRIP contracts, or is this limited to new sole-source negotiations? If the latter, primes retain control over existing programs.
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