
Procurement decisions for C4ISR modernization now face a hidden constraint: systems designed for seamless digital integration cannot be fielded at scale until human-centered fallback procedures are validated and troops are trained to execute them.
This delays fielding timelines for programs like JADC2 and forces Army Program Executive Offices to budget for analog redundancy (radio protocols, paper-based targeting, signal corps expansion) that were previously assumed obsolete. If wargames confirm this across multiple unit types, it reallocates FY27-28 procurement away from advanced sensors and toward training infrastructure and procedural documentation.
This signals a capability gap in contested electromagnetic environments—precisely the scenario doctrine assumes against near-peer adversaries (China, Russia).
If wargame scenarios are representative, Army units may lack sufficient non-digital decision-making protocols and training to operate effectively under jamming or cyber attack.
The finding matters because it forces a choice: either accept degraded performance in high-intensity conflict, or redirect procurement and training resources toward analog/human-backup systems that compete for budget against modernization priorities.
The cost is not just equipment but organizational redesign—doctrine rewrites, personnel retraining, and potential delays to digital transformation initiatives like JADC2.
The article does not specify which electronic systems failed in the wargames, which unit types were tested, whether similar findings emerged in prior exercises, or what 'human fix' protocols are being implemented—making it unclear whether this represents a newly discovered problem or a known issue f...
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