Taiwan Commissions First Batch 2 Tuo Chiang Corvette
The radar substitution is not a minor technical swap. STIR and NA-30S operate on different wavelengths, processing architectures, and fire-control logic — forcing Taiwan to maintain two separate training pipelines, ammunition compatibility matrices, and maintenance protocols across a fleet meant to operate as a unified surface task force.
If the NA-30S supply chain breaks (Italian export denial, production delays, or diplomatic pressure), Taiwan has no fallback: France has already closed the STIR door. This creates a hard dependency on Leonardo's willingness to supply Taiwan under pressure — exactly the leverage Beijing will exploit in a Taiwan Strait contingency.
France's radar export denial forces Taiwan into a mid-production design substitution — a constraint that exposes the fragility of Taiwan's domestic warship supply chain and signals allied export controls are now a binding constraint on Taiwan's force modernization.
The shift from STIR to Leonardo NA-30S radars on five vessels (Batch 2) introduces sensor incompatibility across the 12-ship class, complicating fleet integration and requiring separate logistics streams for fire-control spares and training. Taiwan's goal to deliver all 12 Tuo Chiang corvettes by end-2026 depends on Leonardo radar availability — a single-source dependency on Italian export approval that mirrors the very vulnerability the domestic shipbuilding program was meant to eliminate.
Has Taiwan secured long-term Leonardo NA-30S production or export commitments, or is Batch 2 dependent on ad-hoc approvals that could halt mid-production? What is the interoperability cost of operating two different fire-control systems across a 12-ship class designed for coordinated surface combat?
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