
If the MINURSO mandate is not revived in some form, Morocco's autonomy plan becomes the de facto baseline for any resumed talks, because the UN mediation framework that sustained the referendum option no longer has a monitoring mission behind it. That outcome is what Washington's October 2025 draft had been moving toward, which means the mandate's expiration may be less an accident than a policy result.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which heard from US Ambassador Mike Waltz in April on mission downsizing, is the most likely venue for the first formal accounting — but only if members press for a hearing before the Libya track produces a visible incident.
The House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations subcommittees covering North Africa will inherit both files when the 120th Congress convenes in January, with no administration testimony yet on record explaining either policy.
Atlantic Council analyst Frank Talbot argues that Congress can use conditions on assistance, waiver-explanation requirements, and reporting mandates to force the administration's rationale into the public record before commitments deepen.
The Libya track carries the sharper near-term risk: pressing for a unified Libyan military that absorbs RSF-linked units could expose Washington to legal and reputational liability under existing atrocity-related restrictions on security assistance.
Has the administration formally waived any restrictions on assistance to Libyan military units that UN investigators identified as having aided the RSF, and if so, under what statutory authority?
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