
This connects Market Forces and Geopolitical Friction. On market forces: rare-earth supply concentration creates pricing power for China and exposes US defense contractors (RTX, Lockheed, GE Aerospace) to input cost volatility and potential supply denial. Joint US-Japan development could lower long-term marginal costs and reduce Chinese pricing leverage — but only if projects reach production.
On geopolitical friction: China uses rare-earth export restrictions as a coercive tool (as it did in 2010 against Japan); diversified allied sourcing directly counters that lever. The connection to Power Projection is indirect: rare earths enable advanced weapons, but this is about input security, not capability development.
Rare earths are critical inputs for defense electronics, radar systems, and permanent magnets in advanced weapons platforms.
Japan and the US currently depend on Chinese processing for 60-70% of rare-earth refining globally, creating a structural vulnerability in allied defense supply chains.
If this partnership materializes into joint undersea extraction and processing capacity, it could reduce Chinese leverage over US and Japanese military-industrial production — but only if the projects achieve commercial scale and cost competitiveness within 3-5 years. The immediate value is political signaling of intent; the strategic value depends on whether capital flows and technical partnerships follow.
The article does not specify which undersea deposits are being targeted, what capital commitments either government is prepared to make, timeline for pilot projects, or whether this involves private consortium partnerships (e.g., with rare-earth processors like MP Materials or Lynas Rare Earths).
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