
If the IAF extracted meaningful radar-cross-section and emissions data from two weeks of close-quarters flying against the F-35A, that feeds directly into the AMCA's sensor and electronic warfare requirements — a benefit that does not require India to buy the jet.
The US accepted that trade because the alternative is an IAF that trains exclusively against Russian-origin platforms and remains less interoperable with USAF and allied forces in any Taiwan Strait or Indian Ocean contingency.
The Misawa-to-Jodhpur deployment also demonstrates that the US can project fifth-generation airpower into northwest India on short notice, a logistics data point that INDOPACOM planners now have on the books.
The Indian Air Force spent two weeks flying with and against a fifth-generation stealth aircraft — the closest available proxy for the J-20 and J-35 now in PLA service — at a time when India has no fifth-generation type of its own.
The 13th Fighter Squadron deployed from Misawa with KC-135R tanker support from Kadena, meaning the US Air Force brought a full operational package, not a demonstration flight.
IAF Vice-Chief Air Marshal Ashutosh Dixit publicly acknowledged the IAF is developing its own fifth-generation detection methods alongside the domestic AMCA program, which signals that India is treating the capability gap as a near-term operational problem, not a distant procurement question.
What specific dissimilar air combat training profiles did the IAF fly against the F-35As — did they get beyond-visual-range engagements or only visual-range intercept practice, and did the IAF share sensor data from those engagements with its own AMCA development team?
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