
Russia's drone campaign is now a logistics test for NATO's air defense industrial base. If Ukraine burns through ammunition faster than Western production can replace it, intercept rates collapse within 6-12 months, and Russian strikes shift from degradation to decisive effect.
This directly constrains NATO's ability to support Ukraine without drawing down inventory for European air defense — a calculation already live in the FY27 FYDP.
The consistency matters more than the single night's numbers.
Ukraine is sustaining an 85-90% intercept rate against a Russian drone campaign running at 1,600+ sorties per week — that's roughly 1,300 drones reaching targets weekly despite air defense efforts. At that throughput, Russia is trading attrition for cumulative damage. Ukraine's air defenses are not degrading the campaign below operational effect; they're managing it.
The question is whether Ukraine can sustain this rate of ammunition consumption (implied by 135 kills per night) without resupply acceleration from NATO.
What is Ukraine's weekly expenditure of air defense missiles and rounds at current intercept rates, and what is the resupply commitment from NATO allies for the next 90 days? Without that number, we cannot assess whether this 87% performance is sustainable or a temporary peak.
Strategic intelligence, synthesized daily — with a public track record. Every call graded against what actually happened.