Ukraine's NC13 Unit Deploys Kamikaze Ground Robots With Bullspike Grenade Launchers During Operation Vivaldi
The Bullspike design—72.5 mm warhead, 3.4 kg total weight, 350m range—fits a UGV payload constraint that heavier RPGs (RPG-7, RPG-29) do not. The choice of a Bulgarian-manufactured derivative of a Soviet platform suggests Ukraine is working within its existing supply chain and avoiding NATO ammunition dependency for this specific platform.
If NC13 sustains operations at current tempo, the bottleneck will be UGV chassis production, not grenade supply. The tactic also sidesteps one of Russia's asymmetric advantages—superior artillery and close-in firepower against dismounted assault—by removing the dismounts from the equation.
NC13 is operationalizing a doctrine shift: unmanned assault without infantry involvement as the primary clearing tool, not a support asset.
The 3rd Army Corps has already retaken 125 square kilometers and inflicted 3,000+ Russian casualties across two Vivaldi seasons; this tactic accelerates attrition by trading robot cost against soldier survival. Watch whether other Ukrainian brigades adopt the model — if the doctrine spreads to multiple corps, Russia faces a new targeting problem: UGVs are harder to suppress than concentrated infantry, and the psychological effect (soldiers believing a larger assault force exists) compounds the tactical advantage.
What is the actual production rate of Bullspike-equipped UGVs, and how many has NC13 deployed? The article cites capabilities but not inventory or sustainment baseline.
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