
Bessent's pivot to China reveals that the blockade's sustainability now depends on great-power coordination rather than US naval dominance alone.
If China does not cooperate — and the economic incentives suggest it will not — the US faces either escalation to direct strikes on Iranian oil infrastructure (which would require committing air assets currently positioned for Taiwan contingencies) or a negotiated settlement that concedes the blockade's core objective.
Either path narrows the window for Pacific Command's Taiwan force-posture planning and shifts the cost of the Iran operation onto allied shipping insurers and LNG spot markets, which will flow through to allied defense budgets via energy inflation.
Bessent's demand exposes a critical flaw in the Trump administration's Hormuz strategy: the US cannot sustain a blockade without China's acquiescence, yet lacks the diplomatic tools to secure it.
By publicly asking China to do the work the Navy cannot, Bessent signals that unilateral coercion has hit its ceiling. China will ignore this request. Beijing benefits from the blockade — it depresses oil prices, weakens a regional competitor to its Belt and Road operations, and forces global supply chains into dependency relationships China can exploit.
Asking China to help open Hormuz is asking it to voluntarily surrender leverage. The claim of 'absolute control' is rhetorical cover for a stalled operation: 90 percent shipping collapse without political resolution is not control, it is attrition that burns through US credibility with neutral shippers and allied navies forced to escort convoys with no exit strategy.
Has the Treasury Department modeled what happens if China explicitly refuses and instead deepens its energy purchasing relationship with Iran? And does the administration have a Plan B if the Navy blockade cannot be sustained politically past Q3 2026?
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