
The diversification pattern — abandoning one method while scaling three others — suggests the strikes imposed a cost on go-fast operations specifically, not on the broader logistics network. That means the campaign succeeded tactically (making one route more expensive) but failed strategically (total flow unchanged), which is the predictable outcome when interdiction targets the cheapest, most replaceable link in the supply chain. If the Pentagon's own assessment admits this, the policy question becomes whether Congress continues funding a campaign that moves dots on a map without moving the needle on supply.
The assessment confirms what the operational data already showed: kinetic interdiction without addressing production or demand shifts routes, not volumes.
Traffickers moved from Venezuelan coastal runs to Guyana and Amazon corridors within months of the campaign's start, which means the strike tempo — and the $500M JIATF-401 counter-drone contract awarded July 31 — is chasing a smuggling network that already adapted. Watch whether SOUTHCOM requests supplemental funding for interdiction assets positioned along the new routes, or whether the administration pivots to upstream eradication.
What percentage of the strike budget went to Caribbean operations versus Pacific operations, and did interdiction rates differ between theaters?
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