
The COCO model at a civilian airport removes military maintenance burden entirely, which is the structural advantage here: Dyess does not absorb additional aircraft, personnel, or scheduling pressure.
If the program scales to B-21 Raider pipeline training — where sortie costs will be even higher and aircraft availability tighter — XSTAR or a competitor running the same model could become a standing fixture in AFGSC's aircrew production pipeline, shifting a portion of foundational bomber training permanently off military installations.
AFGSC is trading B-1 sorties — expensive, high-demand, and finite — for cheap bizjet hours to close a foundational airmanship gap that the bomber fleet alone cannot fill.
One hundred additional hours per pilot per year is roughly four extra two-hour sorties per month, and that volume at HondaJet operating costs is a fraction of what a B-1 sortie runs, freeing the bomber's own flight hours for aerial refueling, tactical employment, and weapons delivery.
If XSTAR's operational data supports expansion, AFGSC could extend the COCO model to other bomber communities — B-52 or B-21 pipeline pilots — before the end of the next program year.
What is the current annual B-1 pilot flight-hour shortfall that BSTAR is designed to close, and does the 100-hour target meet the AFGSC readiness standard or only partially address it?
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