If Western governments conclude from the bot disruptions that kinetic strikes on data centers are a viable counter-influence tool, procurement and targeting doctrine will drift toward physical infrastructure at the expense of platform-level enforcement and financial interdiction.
The Tenet Media case — already prosecuted through the Justice Department — shows the more durable lever is following the money through front companies, not targeting server racks.
CEPA's framing of Moscow's doctrine as 'cognitive warfare' rather than legacy propaganda also has budget implications: the EU's StratCom East and NATO's STRATCOM Centre of Excellence will need to justify resourcing for behavioral and algorithmic analysis rather than the traditional media-monitoring mandates their current funding covers.
Counter-disinformation planners at the State Department's Global Engagement Center and EU DisinfoLab face a targeting problem: Moscow's cognitive warfare apparatus runs across Telegram, YouTube, TikTok, and residential internet connections that no drone strike can address, so the physical infrastructure that was hit represents only one layer of a distributed system.
The $9.7 million RT-to-Tenet channel illustrates the point — that funding pipeline ran through front companies and survived intact. If Ukraine's strikes are treated as a template for disrupting Russian information operations, Western planners will systematically undercount the resilience of the cloud-hosted and platform-dependent layers.
Which specific Russian automated network nodes showed measurable recovery timelines after the data center strikes — days or weeks — and does CEPA's research identify any infrastructure that remained offline long enough to affect an active influence campaign?
Strategic intelligence, synthesized daily — with a public track record. Every call graded against what actually happened.