New START expiration erodes nuclear risk management, not arms race trigger

RAND analysis argues that New START's expiration will degrade the transparency mechanisms and dialogue channels that have managed U.S.-Russia nuclear competition since 2010, creating a more volatile strategic environment even without triggering an immediate arms race. The piece distinguishes between the absence of treaty constraints and the loss of verification norms and communication protocols.

Primary pillar: Power Projection. Loss of treaty transparency and verification protocols increases strategic uncertainty, which typically drives higher force readiness costs, more conservative targeting assumptions, and potential acceleration of modernization timelines for strategic systems (ICBMs, SLBMs, early warning). Secondary pillar: Geopolitical Friction.

Absent New START, U.S.-Russia strategic dialogue infrastructure atrophies, raising the cost of crisis communication and lowering the threshold for miscalculation—this is a friction multiplier, not a friction source, but it compounds existing tensions.

WHY IT MATTERS

The erosion of verification and dialogue mechanisms increases the risk of miscalculation during crises—particularly relevant for defense planners modeling strategic stability assumptions.

This affects two distinct constituencies: (1) U.S. command and control systems may face higher uncertainty about Russian force posture, potentially driving more conservative operational planning and higher readiness costs; (2) arms control–adjacent defense programs (missile defense, early warning, strategic communications) may see budget pressure to compensate for lost transparency.

The key variable is whether the U.S. and Russia establish alternative confidence-building measures (military-to-military hotlines, data exchanges) post-expiration. Without them, strategic ambiguity increases; with them, costs rise but risks stabilize.

RAND's framing—'less safe without arms race'—is analytically distinct from Cold War escalation narratives and may influence Congressional testimony on nuclear modernization justifications.

WHAT THIS DOESN’T TELL US

The article does not specify which verification mechanisms are most critical to maintain, which U.S. defense programs depend on New START data for targeting or force sizing, or what the timeline is for alternative agreements (if any) to fill the gap.

New START expiration erodes nuclear risk management, not arms race trigger

Fault Lines