Lloyd's List Intelligence recorded two transits on both July 23 and July 26, with daily passages remaining in single digits throughout the July 19-27 period—but Maritime Intelligence & Research Director Bridget Diakun acknowledged during a Thursday webinar that actual passage counts run higher because the firm only confirms ships that transited with AIS systems off, not estimates their total number. The 52.4 percent week-on-week decline brings Hormuz traffic to March levels, when the U.S.-Iran conflict began, yet ship owners continue sending vessels through despite rising tensions. Diakun noted that "if there are any credible positive developments at a geopolitical level, this picture will change immediately," suggesting owners are making transit-by-transit decisions rather than abandoning the route entirely.
The gap between recorded and actual transits matters most for understanding which actors still operate in the strait and under what commercial terms. If UAE-flagged VLCCs and the 30 LNG carriers mentioned in prior reporting account for most AIS-off passages, then the traffic collapse represents a bifurcation rather than abandonment: compliant shipping has exited while dark-fleet operators capture premium rates for accepting political risk. This creates a selection problem for sanctions enforcement—vessels willing to turn off AIS for Gulf transits are precisely those most likely to later load sanctioned Iranian or Russian cargoes, but their current Gulf runs establish commercial cover. European gas buyers relying on spot LNG have no reliable method to distinguish a carrier that ran dark through Hormuz for insurance reasons from one that does so routinely for sanctions evasion, particularly as these vessels now compete for the same contracts.
Ship owners' continued willingness to transit, as Diakun described, inverts the assumption underlying Project Freedom: that military escort would restore commercial confidence. Instead, owners are treating the strait as a dynamic risk rather than a binary no-go zone, which means traffic will respond to diplomatic signals faster than to force posture changes. Iran's rejection of Oman's governance proposal—reported this week but not detailed in available sourcing—removes the diplomatic variable that might trigger Diakun's "immediate" traffic recovery, leaving owners to price risk on tactical developments alone.
Hormuz transits have returned to conflict-onset levels six months into Project Freedom, confirming that military escorts cannot substitute for diplomatic resolution when ship owners make risk calculations voyage-by-voyage.
The AIS-off traffic that Lloyd's List Intelligence acknowledges but cannot quantify likely represents dark-fleet operators capturing premium rates, which means the Gulf route now selects for vessels willing to evade tracking—exactly the profile sanctions enforcers need to monitor. Diakun's observation that traffic would recover immediately upon "credible positive developments" makes Iran's rejection of Oman's governance proposal the critical variable: Tehran has removed the diplomatic circuit-breaker that could restore commercial confidence without a broader settlement. Houthi threats against Saudi tankers, if acted upon, force Riyadh to choose between accepting Iranian terms for strait access or deploying its own naval forces, which would shift the conflict from a U.S.-Iran bilateral dispute to a regional naval confrontation.
What is the actual daily transit count when AIS-off passages are included — and how many of those are UAE-flagged VLCCs running dark?
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