The real bottleneck is not US policy — it is enforcement velocity. Russia can swap a sanctioned supplier every 2-3 months; Brussels and Washington typically synchronize designations every 4-6 months.
Closing that gap requires either pre-positioning sanctions on the next tier of suppliers (which requires intelligence Ukraine clearly has) or restricting the materials themselves at the export-licensing layer, which hits every company selling to Russia, not just missile makers. The second move: if the Graham-Lindsey bill passes and the EU moves on an interim package in September, Moscow will simply pre-position inventory of the 110 materials before designations take effect — a 60-90 day window that could sustain production through Q1 2027.
Ukraine just quantified what sanctions enforcement has failed to stop: Russia is sustaining 100+ ballistic missiles monthly while sourcing the most demanding components from US fabs through intermediaries faster than designations can catch them.
The constraint is not US export controls — those exist — but the lag between sanctioning a supplier and Moscow's ability to route the same chip through a new gray-market reseller in Dubai or Hong Kong. Vlasiuk's three-part plan (synchronized designations, sectoral restrictions on 110 materials, tightened export licensing) targets the enforcement gap, not the initial control. Watch the House vote on the Graham-Lindsey sanctions bill; if it stalls past mid-September, Ukraine loses its window for an interim EU package before the broader 22nd sanctions round in late October.
How many of the 110 materials Vlasiuk identified are dual-use (civilian electronics also used in ballistic guidance) versus purpose-built military components?
Strategic intelligence, synthesized daily — with a public track record. Every call graded against what actually happened.